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he ‘vizier’ is Ibn Sīnā, known in the Arabic world as the 
“sheikh and prince (al-shaykh al-ra’īs)” of the philosophers,1 
because he was for many years fi rst minister to a series of 
emirs, and who was known in the Latin West as Avicenna. The 
‘friar’ is Br. Thomas of Aquino, a Dominican and by profession a 
theologian. What I propose to consider here is but one aspect of 
the profound infl uence on the thought of Br. Thomas exerted by 
Avicenna’s Book of Healing (al-kitāb al-shifā’), which he mined for 
truth taken from the rational “sciences” that he could introduce 
into theology, itself conceived as a “science.” The term “science” 
both Avicenna and Br. Thomas understood in the Aristotelian 
sense, which is broader than our present cramped usage: the sys-
tematic and demonstrative study of a determinate area of reality, 
which Aristotle had said “has three parts: what it posits, the subject 
whose essential attributes it seeks; the so-called axioms [or prin-
ciples], which are the primary premisses of its demonstrations; and 
the attributes demonstrated.”2
 Young Br. Thomas followed the lead of his Muslim master 
closely concerning all three features of the theoretical sciences. 
In his De principiis naturae he laid out the principles of physical 
science along Avicennian lines, and in his De ente et essentia he set 
out an Avicennian understanding of the principles of metaphysics.3 
In his Scriptum super libros Sententiarum he adopted Avicennian 
principles as well as many of Avicenna’s philosophical conclusions, 
though he rejected conclusions at odds with Christian doctrine, 
like the eternity of the world and mediated creation. And in 1256-
7, while waiting to take his rightful chair among the “masters of 
theology” at the University of Paris, he wrote an incomplete com-
1. L. GARDET, La pensée religieuse d’Avicenne (Vrin, Paris, 1951), 17 n. 1.
2. ARISTOTLE, Posterior Analytics 1.10 (76b13-17). All translations are my own, unless 
otherwise indicated.
3. R. E. HOUSER, Avicenna and Aquinas’s De principiis naturae, cc. 1-3, “Thomist” 76/4 
(2012) 577-610 and The Real Distinction and the Principles of Metaphysics: Avicenna 
and Aquinas in R.E. HOUSER (ed.),  Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of 
Armand Maurer CSB,  Center for Thomistic Studies Series (University of Notre 
Dame Press, Notre Dame, 2007) 75-108.   
T
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mentary, Super Boetium de trinitate, which contains a careful study 
of the “subjects” of the theoretical sciences.4 I propose here to 
show that the fi rst article of Q. 5 is profoundly dependent upon 
4. Studies of Aquinas’s Super Boetium de Trinitate: L. ELDERS, Faith and Science. An 
Introduction to St. Thomas’ Expositio in Boethii de Trinitate (Rome, 1974). A. MAU-
RER, Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas. The Division and Methods of the Sciences 
(Pontifi cal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1986) vii—xli. W. A. WAL-
LACE, St. Thomas’s Conception of Natural Philosophy and its Method, in L. ELDERS 
(ed.) Studi Tomistici. La philosophie de la nature de saint Thomas d’Aquin, (Vatican 
City, 1982) 7-27.  D. HALL, The Trinity: An Analysis of St Thomas Aquinas’ Expositio 
of the De Trinitate’ of Boethius (Brill, Leiden, 1992). Also, B. ASHLEY, The Way 
Toward Wisdom (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 2006) 61-131. 
 On the “subject” of metaphysics (sometimes called the ‘subject matter,’ though 
there is no separate word for ‘matter’ in the texts) according to Avicenna, see: M. 
MARMURA, Avicenna on the Division of the Sciences in the Isagoge of his Shifa’, “Jour-
nal for the History of Arabic Science” 4 (1980) 240-251. M. MARMURA, Avicenna’s 
Critique of Platonists in Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Metaphysics of his Healing, in 
J.E. MONTGOMERY (ed.), Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the 
One: Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank (Peeters, Leuven, 2006) 355-370. A. 
BERTOLACCI, The Reception of Aristotle’s ‘Metaphysics’ in Avicenna’s ‘Kitāb al-Shifā’. 
A Milestone of Western Metaphysical Thought (Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2006) esp. 209 
and 118-126. P. PORRO, Astrazione e separazione: Tommaso d’Aquino e la tradizione 
greco-araba, in P. Porro (ed.), Tommaso d’Aquino, Commenti a Boezio (Bompiani, 
Milan, 2007) 527-580. P. PORRO, Immateriality and Separation in Avicenna and 
Thomas Aquinas. D. HASSE, A. BERTOLACCI, The Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Reception 
of Avicenna’s Metaphysics (De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2012) 275-307. 
 How Aquinas understood “abstraction” and “separation” produced an extensive 
debate. For bibliography, see: P. PORRO, Metafi sica e teolgia nella divisione delle sci-
enze speculative del Super Boetium De Trinitate, in P. PORRO (ed.), Tommaso d’Aquino, 
Commenti a Boezio (Bompiani, Milan, 2007) 467-526. Also, P. PORRO, Immateri-
ality and Separation in Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas, “The Arabic …,” 283-4, n. 
13 and 14, and 305-307. In this fi ne article, Porro correctly fi nds the source of 
Aquinas’s use of “abstraction” and “separation” in Super Boethii de trinitate, q. 5, to 
be Avicenna; and he locates the source in Avicenna’s critique of Platonism in his 
Metaphysics, Bk. VII.  Aquinas’s peculiar understanding of “separation” is certainly 
displayed there, but my contention is that the direct and fundamental source 
of the peculiar way Aquinas understands “separation,” is Avicenna’s Introduction, 
which Br. Thomas also mined for how he often expresses the way essence can be 
understood, as Gilson saw long ago:  “Essences are to be found in three differ-
ent conditions: in themselves, in concrete things, or in our intellect. Considered 
such as they are in themselves, they constitute the proper object of metaphysics; 
considered such as they are in singular things, they constitute the proper object 
of natural science, or physics; considered such as they are in our intellect, they 
constitute the proper object of logic.” E. GILSON, History of Christian Philosophy 
in the Middle Ages (Random House, New York, 1955) 189.  
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Avicenna’s Introduction to Philosophy and Logic,5 and that a correct 
understanding of Aquinas’s conception of the three theoretical sci-
ences depends upon seeing this dependence.
  Following Aristotle and Avicenna, Br. Thomas distinguished 
three areas of the theoretical sciences: the physical sciences, the 
mathematical sciences, and metaphysics. In his Introduction, Avi-
cenna had offered some innovations on Aristotle. He introduced 
cognitional aspects, in addition to real aspects, in order to establish 
the “subjects” of these three sciences, going well beyond Aristotle. 
This innovation opened the way for using both real separation 
from physical matter, as well as abstraction and separation from 
matter in thought, as criteria for distinguishing the theoretical sci-
ences. By doing so, Avicenna could distinguish things that can exist 
separately from matter from things that must so exist, especially 
when explaining the “subject” of metaphysics. And this distinction 
in turn allowed Avicenna to include within metaphysical science 
both ontology and rational theology. On all these points, we shall 
see that when Br. Thomas developed his own understanding of the 
theoretical sciences, he followed Avicenna closely.
1. THREE INTRODUCTIONS
First, a point of clarifi cation. There are actually three introduc-
tions to The Book of Healing.  The one to which I refer was the fi rst 
one, written by Avicenna around 1024, which for the sake of clarity 
I call the Introduction to Philosophy and Logic, because it serves both 
5. The title Introduction to Philosophy and Logic is my term of art, based on Juzjani’s 
Introduction to the Healing, sec. 5. See D. GUTAS, op. cit., 32 and n. 12, where 
Gutas says that the “part, here identifi ed as ‘opening address,’ is almost certainly 
chapters 2-4 in the Cairo edition, containing the introduction to philosophy and 
Logic, not the Prologue to The Cure” Avicenna wrote about 1029. Some of the 
material Aquinas uses is also contained in Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing, 
1.1-2, written earlier. But the order of Aquinas’s presentation in Super B. de trini-
tate, 5.1, what it contains and what it leaves out, and its language, all accord more 
directly with Avicenna’s Introduction to Philosophy and Logic than to Met. 1.1-2. 
What is indisputable, however, is Aquinas’s doctrinal, argumentative, and linguis-
tic dependence on the Latin Avicenna.
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of these purposes.6 It was translated into Latin in Toledo around 
1160 and read by Br. Thomas while an undergraduate in Naples.7
 The last of the three introductions was also written by 
Avicenna (about 1029), after he had fi nished The Healing (writ-
ten 1020-27).8 In looking back, Avicenna conceived The Book of 
Healing as one book. “Our purpose in this book,” he said, was 
to combine the best of “the philosophical sciences attributed to 
the ancients,” that is, Aristotle, with “some of the things which I 
perceived through my own refl ection … especially in physics and 
metaphysics.”9
 The middle introduction was written about 1027, just after 
Avicenna had fi nished The Healing, not by Avicenna himself, but 
by his disciple and biographer al-Juzjani. Avicenna was “the vizier 
of Emir Shams-al-Dawla,” we are told, but after the emir’s death
  
Avicenna saw fi t not to remain in the same state nor to re-
sume the same duties, and trusted that the prudent thing for 
him to do, in furthering his purposes in this regard, would 
be to hide [from his political enemies] in anticipation of an 
opportunity to leave that region.  Availing myself of his un-
expected seclusion and leisure, I pressed him to complete The 
Healing. He voluntarily applied himself with great earnestness 
to its composition, and in a period of twenty days he fi nished 
6. Sadly, this introduction is the only one not analyzed by D. GUTAS in his invalu-
able Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition, 2nd ed. (Brill, Leiden/Boston, 2014). 
The Arabic text is contained in  IBN SĪNĀ, Shifā’, Mantiq, Madhal (Eisagoge), c. 
2, I. MADKOUR, M. EL-KHODEIRI, G. ANAWATI, F. EL-AHWATI (ed.) (Imprimerie 
nationale, Cairo, 1952) 12-16. The Latin text is Avicenna, Logica, c. 1, which I 
have taken from Avicennae peripatetici philosophi ac medicorum facile primi Opera 
omnia (1508 rpr., Venice, 1960). All my English translations of what I am calling 
Avicenna’s Introduction to Philosophy and Logic are from the Latin text, though I 
have included Latin and Arabic words, where appropriate.   
7. The evidence he knew Avicenna’s Introduction that early is because his teacher in 
Naples, Master Peter of Ireland, knew it and used it to begin his own commen-
tary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation (ca. 1260). See PETER OF IRELAND, Magistri 
Petri De Ybernia, “Philosophes médiévaux” 334 (Peeters, Louvain, 1996). Date of 
composition: 1260-8, p. xvi; uses Avicenna’s Introduction, 3.1-4.42.  
8. D. GUTAS, op. cit., 41-46.  
9. D. GUTAS, op. cit., 42-3.  
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Metaphysics and Physics, relying solely upon his natural tal-
ents.  He also started on Logic and wrote the opening address 
and associated material.10
“Twenty days” might seem hyperbolic—and it was toned down in 
Juzjani’s biography (written after 1037)—but there is no reason to 
doubt his relative chronology. This “opening address,” then, must 
be the very same Introduction to Philosophy and Logic considered 
here. It was written after Avicenna had composed the bulk of the 
physics and all the metaphysics of The Healing (1022-4), and as he 
was moving to its logical and mathematical sections (1024-7).
2. THE GREEKS
In the Apology, Socrates relates that in response to the Oracle he 
questioned three groups of Athenians—craftsmen, statesmen, and 
poets.11 These three became emblems for three kinds of knowl-
edge—productive, practical, and theoretical. Though we normally 
think knowledge is about things in our common world, knowledge 
itself exists subjectively in the mind of the individual knower, mak-
ing it notoriously hard to grasp. This diffi culty fi rst drove Plato, 
then Aristotle, to turn outside the mind to the things known (noeta) 
in order to understand knowledge itself.  In his Republic, Plato fa-
mously proposed to explain the knowledge his “philosopher king” 
should seek—a unifi ed and all-encompassing wisdom—by looking 
outside the soul, to “the thing known,” what since the middle ages 
has been called the “object” of knowledge.12 In his divided line, he 
set out four types of intellectual cognition, based on four different 
“objects.”  “Image thinking (eikasia)” and “belief (pistis)” are kinds 
of “opinion (doxa)” that is uncertain and changes because their 
“objects” are changing individual physical things. Those things 
10. D. GUTAS, op. cit., 32.
11. PLATO, Apology (20b1-22e4).
12. L. DEWAN, OBIECTUM: Notes on the Invention of a Word, “Archives d’histoire 
doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge” 48 (1981) 37-96.
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are “movable (kineton)” because material. But beyond opinion lies 
a realm of unchanging, universal, and necessary knowledge, which 
at the highest level Plato calls “science (episteme).”13 What makes 
such knowledge truly “science” are its exterior objects, “immobile” 
because separate from changing physical matter. Higher knowl-
edge is divided into “deductive knowing (dianoia),” exemplifi ed but 
not exhausted by the objects of mathematics, and “understanding 
(noêsis),” achieved by the “science of dialectic”14 that studies the 
forms.  If we recognize that the “objects” of both eikasia and pis-
tis are physical things, we get three levels of cognition: opinions 
about natural things, deductive knowledge about mathematicals, 
and scientifi c understanding of forms.  
 In a triumph of common sense over theoretical purity, Aristotle 
fractured Plato’s unifi ed wisdom into many parts and divided theoret-
ical knowledge into three areas: the physical sciences, the mathemati-
cal sciences, and what came to be called “metaphysics.” At Metaphysics 
Γ.1, Aristotle described the “subject” of metaphysics this way: 
 
There is a science that studies being as being and its essential 
attributes. This science is not the same as any of the so-called 
particular sciences, for none of the others studies being as 
being universally; but they cut off some part of it and study 
the accidents of it, such as the mathematical sciences.15
But lest we think that metaphysics is completely universal in scope, 
Aristotle goes on to explain that “being is said in many ways,” as 
are “healthy” and “medical,” so that metaphysics is confi ned to the 
prime instance of “being (on),” that is, “substance (ousia).” Conse-
quently, “of substances the philosopher must grasp the principles 
and causes.”16
 Then at Metaphysics E.1 Aristotle dashed any hope that “uni-
versal” metaphysical science would look like Plato’s comprehen-
13. PLATO, Republic 6 (509d1-511e2), 7 (533a1-534b3).
14. PLATO, Republic 6 (511c5) and 7 (533d4, e8).
15. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, Γ.1 (1003a20-7).
16. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, Γ.1 (1003a32-b19).
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sive wisdom, both theoretical and practical. Aristotelian wisdom 
must be purely theoretical knowledge; and then Aristotle trans-
formed Plato’s divided line into three theoretical sciences:
 
Natural science is about things that are not separate and not 
immobile; and some mathematical sciences are about things 
that are immobile but also not separate, as they are in matter; 
and the fi rst science is about things that are separate and im-
mobile… Therefore, there will be three theoretical philoso-
phies: mathematical, physical, and theological.”17
The criteria Aristotle uses to distinguish these “sciences” are mo-
tion and its principle matter, criteria that are purely objective, 
that is, concerned solely with the things studied in these sciences. 
Theology studies the gods, who are “separate” from matter, “im-
mobile,” and therefore “eternal.” Mathematics studies what is “im-
mobile” and so the source of unchanging knowledge, but its ob-
jects are “not separate” from matter. How this is possible Aristotle 
does not work out here, but it required him to invent his theory 
of mathematical “abstraction” from matter, which he elaborated 
in Metaphysics M and N.18 Physics studies things that are “not 
separate (achôrista) and not immobile.”19 In his description of the 
17. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics E.1 (1026a13-20).
18. ARISTOTLE uses “abstraction” (aphairesis) only about mathematical science. See 
Metaphysics K.3 (1061a28-b3); Physics, II.2 (193b34-5); On the Soul, III.7 (431b12-
16). Also, J. OWENS, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’ (Pontifi cal 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1951) 239: “The Mathematicals are not 
separate, but they are considered by the mathematician as separate. This treatment 
is made possible by ‘abstraction,’ that is by subtracting and leaving out of consider-
ation all the other sensibles and retaining only the quantity. … From the standpoint 
of the sciences, then, ‘abstraction’ is reserved for the Mathematicals.”
19. Schwegler emended “not separate” to “separate (chôrista). On the reading of the 
manuscripts, “separate” and “not separate” in all three descriptions are under-
stood in the same way, in relation to matter. On Schwegler’s emendation, when 
describing physics Aristotle meant ‘separate from other things,’ in contrast with 
accidents, for example. But this change would mean he employed two different 
senses of “separate.” The reading of the manuscripts is more plausible; but on ei-
ther reading physics studies the changing and material beings of the visible world, 
in contrast with the unchanging objects of mathematics and metaphysics. See P. 
PORRO, Immateriality and Separation in Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas, 278-9.
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three theoretical sciences, then, Aristotle introduced the notion 
of “separate” from matter as a purely ontological term; it was not 
meant to describe some act of cognition. And he also introduced 
the notion of “abstraction,” which does describe a mental act; but 
he applied it only to mathematics. If Aristotle, then, supplied Avi-
cenna with a conclusion—there are three theoretical sciences—the 
Vizier would have to develop his own arguments for it.
3. AVICENNA’S INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY AND LOGIC
In Avicenna’s Introduction, before the reader is introduced to logic, 
he is ushered into the whole of The Healing, because the three 
theoretical sciences are the end, for whose attainment logic is the 
method.  Since he argues from their ends to their subjects, Avi-
cenna begins with their common end: “The purpose of philosophy 
is to comprehend the truth of all things, in so far as it is possible for 
a human to understand” (1Av).20 In using the word “thing” (shay’, 
res) Avicenna shows he is using the principles and the language of 
the Metaphysics he had just completed:  “being (mawjūd, ens), thing 
(shay, res), and necessary (darūri, necesse),” along with “existence 
(wujūd, esse).”21 In order to organize this terrain, Avicenna sets out 
a series of divisions, for the purpose of uncovering defi nitions, a 
dialectical mode of argument. While Aristotle had divided knowl-
edge directly into the three Socratic types—productive, practical, 
and theoretical—the best division is exhaustive bifurcation, which 
is just what Avicenna does. So his fi rst division is this: 
 
20. The references in parentheses refer to section in the appended table: “Friar and 
Vizier.” Numbers are taken from the order of the sections of Avicenna’s text, to 
which abbreviations for Aristotle (Ar), Avicenna (Av), and Aquinas (Aq) are added. 
For example, 3Av) refers to the third section of the text of Avicenna’s Introduction. 
Parallel to this text are 3Ar) from ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics E.1 and 3Aq) from 
AQUINAS, Super librum Boetii de trinitate, q. 5, art. 1. Using these numbers, parallel 
texts from all three authors can be directly compared. This example also shows 
that, while 2Aq) and 3Aq) make use of 2Av) and 3Av), Aquinas has reversed Avi-
cenna’s order of presentation.
21. AVICENNA, Metaphysics, 1.5 sec. 1 (Marmura 22.11) and sec. 8 (24.6).
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Now the things that are either have existence not owing to 
our choice or operation, or they have existence owing to our 
choice or operation.  Knowledge of the fi rst type is called 
speculative philosophy, while knowledge of the second type is 
called active [later practical] philosophy (2Av).   
Avicenna then turns again to fi nal causality, to the “ends” of these 
two kinds of knowledge. While all philosophy aims to “know the 
truth,” the end of speculative philosophy is “the perfection of the 
soul as simply knowing,” while the end of “active” philosophy is 
“knowing what one ought to do and doing it” (3Av). Knowledge, 
then, is part of the end, even of practical philosophy. 
 Avicenna next sets out on the trail of the speculative sciences 
using a series of further divisions. In his second division, things 
“whose existence does not come from our will or operation, are di-
vided into two, into things mixed with motion and things not mixed 
with motion” (4Av). This division will eventually yield the three 
speculative sciences in Aristotle’s list, but not immediately; further 
divisions are required. Avicenna’s third division is this: “Now things 
mixed with motion are divided into two: into things that do not have 
existence unless it is possible that they be mixed with motion, such 
are humanity and square and similar things; or into things that can 
have existence without this [motion]” (5Av). The notion of things 
that must move is familiar from Aristotle’s conception of “nature” 
as an intrinsic principle of motion and rest (repeated by Avicenna).22 
But the second group—“things that can have existence without mo-
tion”—is a bit baffl ing, since it seems to cross the divide between 
the material and the immaterial. It certainly was never mentioned by 
Aristotle. The term “can” introduces the notion of possibility, one 
of his trinity of modal metaphysical principles—necessary, possible, 
and impossible. This innovation opens up the possibility of a “sci-
22. ARISTOTLE, Physics II.1(192b1-193b22); also, AVICENNA, Physics, Bk. 1, On the 
Causes and Principles of Natural Things, in MCGINNIS (ed. and tr.); 1.5 sec. 3, 39.1-
13 and 1.6. sec. 1, 45.3-6, Latin translation: AVICENNA, Liber primus naturalium: 
tractatus primus de causis et pricipiis naturalium, in VAN RIET (ed.); 1.5, 51.37-52.54, 
and 1.6, 59.3-11.
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ence” that studies things that can exist materially, but also can exist 
in an immaterial way. But what is that science?   
 Avicenna fi rst elaborates the more familiar side of his distinc-
tion. His fourth division is this: Things “mixed with motion are again 
divided into two: for they are such that they can neither exist nor be 
understood without their proper matter, for example, the form of a 
human or an ass; or such that they can be understood but they can-
not exist without matter, for example, square” (6-8Av). Avicenna’s 
examples make it clear that he is distinguishing the physical sci-
ences from the mathematical ones. Since motion has matter as its 
principle, Avicenna collapses Aristotle’s ‘motion’ and ‘matter’ into 
a single real criterion that holds for both, but which he describes 
using his own metaphysical principles: “existence with matter.” 
 In order to distinguish mathematics from physics, Avicenna 
needs a second criterion. Aristotle was little help, because he had fo-
cused solely on the realities studied (4Ar, 7Ar, 10Ar). This is why he 
had hesitated between Plato’s separationist theory of mathematics and 
the abstractionist account Aristotle himself sketched out elsewhere.23 
So Avicenna appeals a second time to modal notions, now applied, not 
to realities, that is, to the natures of the things studied, but applied to 
the possibility of our understanding them. This second criterion is a 
signal innovation: our mental ability to understand the thing without its 
“proper matter.”  The physical sciences study things that cannot exist 
separately from physical matter, nor can they be understood apart 
from physical matter (7Av). The mathematical sciences, by contrast, 
study things that can be understood apart from physical matter, even 
if they “cannot exist without matter” (8Av). While every real square, 
23. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics E.1 (1026a13-15), ROSS (trans.). On Aristotle’s theory of 
abstraction, see J. OWENS, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian ‘Metaphysics’, 2nd 
ed. (Pontifi cal Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1963) 382-384. “What is 
‘abstracted’ for Aristotle is really ‘subtracted.’ It is removed from consideration. 
… Mathematics alone among the sciences deliberately ‘leaves out’ much that is 
knowable in the things with which it deals. It omits, in fact, everything knowable 
in them except quantity.” Avicenna and Aquinas would try to show how this is 
possible; Aristotle had not done so. On Aquinas’s theory of mathematics, see A. 
MAURER, Thomists and Thomas Aquinas on the Foundation of Mathematics, “Review 
of Metaphysics” 47 (1993) 43-61.
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say, a table-top, actually exists in physical matter, the geometrical ob-
ject “square” has no necessary connection with some physical species 
like a wooden table, nor with motion, like the table being built by a 
carpenter. Avicenna’s explanation rests on a theory of abstraction, but 
he does not go into that theory, nor as yet even use that terminology. 
By using human understanding to distinguish physics from mathe-
matics, however, Avicenna brings cognition into the very division of 
the sciences and the explanation of their “subjects,” something Aris-
totle did not do in Metaphysics E.1. This innovation will not escape the 
notice of Br. Thomas.24
 Having distinguished physics from mathematics (6-8Av), Avi-
cenna returns to the other side of the third division (5Av), to “things 
that can be mixed with motion, but also have existence without it” 
(9Av). At fi rst glance, it may not be obvious to the reader just what 
kinds of things Avicenna is talking about or how they are related to 
the subject of the science we expect here—metaphysics. So the fi rst 
thing he does is to offer some helpful examples. He means “things 
like identity, unity, multiplicity, and causality” (9Av). At Metaphys-
ics 1.5, Avicenna had introduced the ‘one and many’ as examples 
of what later will be called the transcendentals, because they are 
not confi ned to some one of Aristotle’s ten categories, or to any of 
them. Identity or sameness, in its most precise Aristotelian meaning 
is simply unity limited to the category of substance,25 but Avicenna, 
like Aristotle himself, does use “same” to refer to an individual, even 
one outside the category of substance. And while a cause is not a 
transcendental in the strictest sense, there are both physical causes 
and causes completely separated from matter. So let us call these 
four terms—identity, unity, multiplicity, and causality—examples 
of Avicennian transcendentals.26
24. See AQUINAS, Super Boetium de Trinitate, q. 5, art. 2 and 3.
25. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, I.3 (1054a30-b2).
26. Avicenna was aware of, but did not thematize, the difference between traits like 
being, unity, goodness, and truth, which are found in everything that exists, and 
attributes like causality, which are not. “Cause” can be thought of as a “disjunctive 
transcendental,” because all things are either causes or effects. This approach to 
the transcendentals was popularized by Scotus, whose prime example was ‘fi nite 
and infi nite being.’
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 That Avicenna intends these transcendentals to introduce his 
description of the subject of metaphysics is clear from the very 
next sentence:  
 
Among the things that can be denuded (denudari; tajarrad) 
from motion is truth (veritas; ṣiḥḥa), which takes two forms: 
either necessary truth, such as God and an  intelligence, (10Av) 
or truth that is not necessary but is truth for things that are 
not impossible, for example, the dispositions of identity, unity, 
causality, and the kind of number that is multiplicity (11Av).
With this crucial sentence, Avicenna makes several important 
points. Let us consider each in turn.
 First, Avicenna introduces one of the two terms he uses in 
the Introduction to signify the “abstraction” or “separation” of 
something from matter: jarada (the other is faraqa).  The basic 
meaning of jarada is to remove the outer portion of something, 
as in peeling the rind of an orange, and when applied to people 
it can mean to ‘undress.’ Here the Toledo translators rendered it 
“denuded (denudari) of motion.” While moving things have a kind 
of ontological truth, truth can also be abstracted from motion, 
when truth is found in immobile things. In “abstraction,” then, 
two things happen: something is left behind or ‘abstracted from’—
in these examples, motion and the natural matter found in things 
that move; and something is ‘taken away’ or ‘lifted off’ from its 
natural subject, in this case, truth. Later (12Av) Avicenna uses the 
same word for the mental process of abstracting one notion from 
another: “consideration of them [the Avicennian transcendentals] 
does not change when they are despoiled (spoliatae sunt, mujarra-
dat) [of matter]” (12Av).27 Avicenna’s fi nal use of this term comes 
27. The Toledo translators here made use of the memorable history of spoliare, which 
included the spolia opima, the “rich spoils” taken when a Roman general wins in 
single combat with an opposing general, and also Augustine’s “spoiling the Egyp-
tians,” when he compared Christians using the philosophy of the Greeks to the 
Hebrews taking the gold from the Egyptians when they escaped under Moses for 
the Promised Land. AUGUSTINE, De doctrina christiana, 2.144-7; Confessions, 7.9.15.
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at the end of his explanation of how mathematicians demonstrate 
the “dispositions that follow on number.” These attributes, he 
says, “can be abstracted (abstrahi; tajarrada) in a certain way, so that 
it is not necessary to assign specifi c matter to them” (14Av), that is, 
the kind of matter found in nature. Of the three translations of the 
same Arabic word, abstrahi is the word Aquinas will adopt, as we 
shall see.28 We will take up the other term—faraqa—in due course. 
 The second thing Avicenna does is to add another transcen-
dental: “truth.”29 Truth does not mean what Aristotle had meant—
cognitional truth existing only in the mind, which consists in a 
correlation of mind with reality.30 Rather, Avicenna means truth 
in an ontological sense, as a feature of all beings, one that he had 
used in setting out the principles of his own Metaphysics.31 There 
Avicenna identifi ed this sense of truth with the ontological prin-
ciple “quiddity” (quidditas; māhiyya), the basis for his understand-
ing of the fundamental metaphysical notion “thing.” Since “truth” 
is as universal a notion as “being” (māwjūd; ens), it points to the 
subject of metaphysics, “being as being” understood as common to 
28. A.M GOICHON, Lexique de la langue philosophique d’Ibn Sina (Avicenne) (Desclée de 
Brouwer, Paris, 1938) entry 89 (38).
29. The Arabic term ṣiḥḥa, in a metaphysical context means a strong sense of objec-
tive (as opposed to cognitional) truth. Its verbal form was often rendered by “to 
be certifi ed (certifi cari)”, “to be verifi ed (verifi cari)” or even “able to be (posse esse).” 
It was here rendered into Latin as veritas, but was sometimes rendered into Latin 
as certitudo or certus. It is one of three terms for ontological truth Avicenna uses. 
See S. VAN RIET, Lexiques, vol. 3 of Avicenna Latinus: Liber de philosophia prima sive 
scientia divina (Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1983), Arabic root 468. The second 
term is “veracity (ṣidq),” root 473, which was often rendered into Latin as certi-
tudo, and the adjective as certus. The third and most normal term is “truth (ḥaqq),” 
root 192, which was often rendered as verus or veritas, but also as certus or certitudo 
in contexts where an ontological sense of truth is intended. At 10-11Av, Avicenna 
clearly means truth in its ontological sense.
30. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, E.4 (1027b17-1028a5) and Θ.10 (1051a34-1052a12).
31. AVICENNA, Metaphysics, 1.5 sec. 5 (23.11) and 9 (24.9-11), and 1.8 sec. 1 (38.15-
17). On the ontological and cognitional senses of truth in Avicenna, and the Ara-
bic and Latin terminology, see R. E. HOUSER, The Real Distinction and the Prin-
ciples of Metaphysics: Avicenna and Aquinas, in R.E. HOUSER (ed.), Laudemus viros 
gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer CSB, Center for Thomistic Studies 
Series (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 2007) 75-108; BERTO-
LACCI, Reception, 166, 262-3.
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all things.32 For Avicenna, then, this Aristotelian formula for the 
“subject” of metaphysics includes “things that can be mixed with 
motion, but also have existence without it” (Av9). 
 Thirdly, Avicenna here divides the things that can be ab-
stracted from motion into “necessary truth,” that is, necessary be-
ings such as God and the intelligences (‘aql, intelligentia),33 whose 
very nature requires them to be completely separate from motion 
and matter, and the “truth” of possibles, things which can exist in 
conjunction with motion and matter or “denuded” of motion and 
matter. This division effectively distinguishes two parts of “meta-
physical science,” theology and ontology. This is the hard lesson 
Avicenna had learned from al-Farabi’s little work On the Objects of 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, as Avicenna himself would say later in his 
Autobiography.34
 Avicenna mentions theology but briefl y, in order to move 
directly to his ontology (11-14Av). Ontology considers “truth that 
is not necessary but is truth for things that are not impossible” 
(11Av), that is, beings that are possible in themselves. To clarify, he 
immediately adds examples, which turn out to be the very same 
ones he introduced earlier (at 9Av)—identity, unity, causality, and 
multiplicity. Repeating the examples does not seem to be a scribal 
error, but seems designed to point out that “consideration of them 
does not change when they are despoiled [from matter]” (12Av). 
But if they remain the same, whether existing in matter or not, why 
should treatment of them be placed in metaphysics rather than 
another science? Avicenna’s answer is telling. Since the transcen-
dentals are such universal attributes of things, they do turn up in 
all three theoretical disciplines—physics, mathematics, and meta-
physics—though not in the same way. So in order to explain his 
ontology and thereby the “subject” of his metaphysics, Avicenna 
32. AVICENNA, Metaphysics, 1.2 sec. 12-13 (Arabic: 9.17-10.8; Latin 12.3-13.46).
33. S. VAN RIET, Lexiques, root 574, 82. “Intelligences” is not in Avicenna’s Arabic 
text, but it is in the Latin translation.
34. FARABI, Fī aghrāḍ, in  F. DIETERICI (ed.), Alfarabi’s Philosophische Abhandlungen 
(Brill, Leiden, 1890) 34-38. AVICENNA, Autobiography, sec. 9, in GUTAS, Avicenna 
and the Aristotelian Tradition, 28.
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briefl y sketches how the transcendentals he has used as examples—
one, many, identity, and cause—are treated, fi rst in metaphysics, 
then in physics, and fi nally in mathematics. And in the course of 
this sketch, Avicenna introduces the language of “separation (far-
aqa),” in addition to “abstraction (jarada).” Br. Thomas will adopt 
both terms, in their Avicennian meaning, in his own explanation 
of the three theoretical sciences, as we shall see. 
 The transcendentals are studied in metaphysics “because 
these things as such are not in matter” (12Av). Unity considered as 
such, multiplicity considered as such, and also causality and iden-
tity considered in themselves, are not limited to material things. 
So they are studied the science that studies immaterial things, to 
be sure, but the study of the transcendentals falls within the ambit 
of the ontology, not theology. In short, while metaphysics includes 
a rational theology, it fi rst must include an ontology that studies 
the attributes that span the universal range of beings, whose em-
blem here is transcendental “truth.”
 The transcendentals, however, also come up in physics and 
mathematics. In physics, the four transcendental attributes Avi-
cenna mentions are understood in relation to specifi c matter and 
motion. For example, consideration of the one in so far as it is air 
or fi re; consideration of the many in so far as they are the elements; 
consideration of cause in so far as it is cold or heat, and consideration 
of a second, intelligible [actuality], in so far as it belongs to ani-
mals, namely, a principle of bodily motion, even if, when separated 
(mufāraqat; separata) from it, it can exist on its own. (14Av). 
 The one, the many, and cause are all identifi ed by the physicist 
with specifi c kinds of matter. And the soul, which is the principle 
of identity in living things, is an especially apt example. While the 
souls of brute animals are the mortal, formal causes of their com-
posite being, the human soul, by contrast, exists in both conditions, 
as the formal cause of the composite, and therefore only a part of 
its being, but also separately from its body, “on its own.” The point 
here is that when, say, ‘one’ or ‘many’ are studied in physics, they 
are not studied in themselves, but as connected with some particular 
kind of matter, such as air or fi re or the elements.  
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 In treating physics, Avicenna introduces the other term rel-
evant to his theory of abstraction—faraqa—which he will use fi ve 
times. Its basic meaning is to distinguish, differentiate, or separate 
one thing from another. Avicenna consistently uses the noun farq 
to mean the logical notion “difference,” which contracts a genus 
to its underlying species; and the Toledo translators rendered this 
word by differentia. The third form of the verb (fāraqa), which re-
lates its action toward something else, was consistently translated 
as separari, whose plural passive participle, what is “separated” or 
“separate” is mufāraqat, consistently translated as separata.35 The 
point of his example of the human soul, then, is that it can exist in 
two states, either united with the human body and functioning as 
its form, or separated from the body, existing in a purely spiritual 
state. 
 Avicenna then turns to the role his transcendentals play in 
mathematics. He begins with the difference between the way the 
objects of mathematics really exist and the way the mathematician 
considers them intellectually.
 
Now even though this only occurs in relation to matter and 
with admixture of motion, nevertheless, sometimes their dis-
positions can be understood and verifi ed without consideration 
of their proper matter and motion.  
Avicenna then clarifi es by listing some mathematical operations:
This kind of consideration happens, for example, concerning ad-
dition and subtraction (al-tafrīq; segregatione), multiplication and 
division, and the finding of a root, and in the  other dispositions 
that follow on number. 
His term for subtraction is not the modern ṭraḥa but a form of 
faraqa, since in (5 – 3 = 2), three units are removed or separated 
from fi ve, with the result that fi ve is reduced to two units. This 
35. S. VAN RIET, Lexiques, root 643, 93.
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clarifi cation allows us to see that the objects of mathematics can 
exist in two ways: 
For these follow on number and either exist in the intellect 
of humans or in existing moving things that are divided, sub-
tracted (mutafarriqat, segretatis) or added. But understanding 
these things sometimes can be abstracted (abstrahi; tajarradā) 
in a certain way, so that it is not necessary to assign specifi c 
matter to them.  
Here Avicenna again uses a form of the word ‘separation’ to de-
scribe subtraction; but he then points out what subtraction is per-
formed on, a number that has been abstracted from the “specifi c 
matter” in which it really exists. The passage seems to imply that 
the number, ‘two’ in this case, once abstracted, does exist in some 
sort of matter, but not the kind of physical matter in which the ob-
jects of physics really exist and must be included in the physicist’s 
understanding of numbers.   
 Avicenna’s brief presentation of arithmetic, however, does 
not end at the level of separation, but he returns to abstraction, 
even to using this term. As Aristotle had fi rst seen, abstraction is 
the operation that characterizes mathematics. The “specifi c mat-
ter” in which a number exists in the real, physical world is ‘left 
behind’; and what is ‘pulled off’ is some quantitative feature of 
the thing, which now exists only in the mind of the mathemati-
cian. While Aristotle’s metaphysics of form had diffi culty explain-
ing how such abstraction is possible, Avicenna’s metaphysics of 
existence has no problem explaining abstraction. The existentially 
neutral quantitative quiddity, which existed materially in a physical 
being in the material world, now comes to exist immaterially in the 
mind of the mathematician. This is the sense in which, as Avicenna 
says, numbers are “abstracted in a certain way.”    
 Having explained how the transcendentals are studied in all 
three theoretical sciences, Avicenna sums up his results. In doing 
so, he uses the term “separate (mufāraqāt; separata),” but with nec-
essary qualifi cations: 
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 48/1 (2015) 19-54
THE FRIAR AND THE VIZIER ON THE RANGE OF THE THEORETICAL SCIENCES
37
Therefore, the parts of the sciences are speculative knowledge 
about understanding those things that have existence and re-
ality in motion and depend on the matter of their proper spe-
cies; or speculative knowledge about what is separate from the 
matter of their proper species only in thought (min haythu 
mufāraqāt li-tilka taṣawwurā lā qawāmā, secundum quod sunt 
separata ab his in intellectum tantum); or about things separate 
(mufāraqāt; separata) from these conditions both in existence 
and in understanding (15Av). 
One of Avicenna’s two criteria for distinguishing these sciences is 
objective: Do the things studied “exist with motion” and matter? 
His other criterion is subjective: Does the knowledge the science 
achieves “depend upon the matter that is proper to its [natural] 
species?” The Latin translation is not as complete as the Arabic, 
since it omits half the story for physics and mathematics; but its 
message is clear enough. In explaining “divine science,” however, 
Avicenna uses both criteria explicitly: “in existence” the things 
studied are “separate from these,” that is, from material condi-
tions, and so our “understanding” of them cannot involve mo-
tion and matter. The term “separate,” then, clearly has two senses: 
“separate in thought” and “separate in existence.”36
36. P. PORRO, op. cit., 295-6 explains the two senses of ‘separate’ using logic: “Avicenna 
makes a distinction between plain or simple negation and negation by equipollence 
(or perhaps, better, metathesis). Plain negation denies the verb, and thus renders a 
proposition negative, as in the case: ‘Zayd is not sighted’; whereas negation by me-
tathesis (‘udūl: equipollence, according to Inati’s and Marmura’s translations) is that 
negation which denies the predicate and, in this sense, is equivalent to a (metathetic) 
affi rmation such as ‘Zayd is non-sighted’.” While Porro’s formal logic is unexcep-
tionable, his explanation of the distinction between “plain negation” and “negation 
by equipollence” is itself founded on more fundamental principles, Avicenna’s three 
modal concepts. In his Introduction, Avicenna passes over the formal logic of proposi-
tions but draws his conclusions purely in terms of modal concepts, notably, the pos-
sible (“can”) and the necessary. The Arabic verb jāza, which originally meant ‘to pass 
through’ or ‘to be permitted’, when used philosophically was used to express possibil-
ity, and was translated at Toledo as posse, posse esse, and possibile esse. See S. VAN RIET, 
Lexiques, root 155, 22-23. The presence of this language in the Introduction makes it 
the direct source of Aquinas’s views, as set out in Super Boethii de trinitate, q. 5.
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 Once he has presented the objects studied in the three theo-
retical sciences, the very last thing Avicenna does is to name these 
sciences. The fi rst is called “natural science,” the second is “purely 
mathematical and the science of numbers,” while the last is called 
“divine science” (15Av). Aristotle was correct to divide the theo-
retical sciences into these three, and Avicenna follows Aristotelian 
terminology. But Aristotle’s explanations were inadequate. 
4. AQUINAS, SUPER LIBRUM BOETHII DE TRINITATE, Q. 5, ART. 1
When Br. Thomas turned to the “matter” or subjects of the theo-
retical sciences in his commentary on Boethius’s De trinitate, he quite 
naturally thought of Aristotle, and quotes him in the “response” to 
the question “Is speculative science properly divided into these three 
parts: natural, mathematical, and divine?” Aristotle was an authority 
from whom Br. Thomas had much to learn; but at this early stage of 
his career, Avicenna’s were the philosophical books he had read most 
carefully, including his Introduction. So it was quite natural that the 
Persian, rather than the Greek, was the direct source from whom Br. 
Thomas drew. 
 Br. Thomas’s “response” in Art. 1 covers the same material Avi-
cenna had covered in his introduction: the ends and the subject-matters 
of the three theoretical sciences. And he does so, by and large, in 
the same way, adopting Avicenna’s language and his explanations and 
arguments. But as he always does in dealing with the Latin Avicenna, 
Br. Thomas shows even this early in his career that singular skill in 
summarizing, simplifying, and clarifying the often diffuse and always 
diffi cult text of the Latin Avicenna. While maintaining Avicennian 
doctrine and important parts of his language, he changes the Persian’s 
order, simplifi es, and clarifi es. The response begins this way:
  
The theoretical or speculative intellect is properly distin-
guished from the operative or practical intellect from the fact 
that the speculative intellect has for its end the truth it consid-
ers, while the practical intellect orders the truth it considers 
to operation as to its end. Therefore, the Philosopher says in 
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On the Soul 3 that they differ from each other in  their ends, 
and in Metaphysics 2 that ‘the end of speculative science is 
truth, but the end of operative science is action’ (3Aq).
Avicennian infl uence is present from the outset, for Br. Thomas 
begins on the subjective side, with “intellect,” as Avicenna had 
taught him, rather than outside, where Aristotle had remained 
throughout his account. And he begins with Avicenna’s bifurca-
tion between practical and speculative intellect, rather than Ar-
istotle’s three-fold division. He then introduces “truth,” an Avi-
cennian theme. And led by Avicenna’s assertion that “truth” is 
the “purpose” of all “philosophy,” Thomas inserts “truth” into his 
description of the end of practical science, as well as theoretical 
science, following Avicenna. This point is quite different from Ar-
istotle, even in the text Thomas quotes, where the Philosopher had 
sharply contrasted “truth” as the end only of theoretical science, with 
“action” as the only end of practical science. Finally, much of Br. 
Thomas’s language—speculativus, operativus, and veritas—comes 
from the Latin Avicenna, not from the Latin Aristotle. 
  The only difference from Avicenna is that Br. Thomas begins 
with the ends of the sciences rather than their subjects; but he has 
a good reason for that, since Avicenna’s argument, as distinct from 
his order or presentation, moved from the ends of the sciences to 
their subject-matters. Thomas’s order of presentation simply fol-
lows the Avicennian order of the argument. 
Therefore, since matter must be proportionate to the end, it 
is necessary that the matter of the practical sciences is those 
things that can be done by our operation, so that knowledge of 
them can be ordered to operation as to an end. But it is neces-
sary that the matter of the speculative sciences is those things 
that are not done by our operation, so that consideration of 
them cannot be ordered to operation as to an end. (2Aq)
Br. Thomas transitions gracefully from the “end” to the “subjects” 
of the sciences, following the direction of Avicenna’s argument 
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(“Therefore”). His description of the differences between the sub-
ject-matters, his language, and his doctrine come straight out of 
Avicenna’s Introduction. Br. Thomas uses a bifurcating division, like 
Avicenna and different from Aristotle. His description of that dif-
ference is thoroughly Avicennian. Practical science concerns “things 
(res) that can be done by our operation (nostro opere),” while specula-
tive knowledge concerns “things that are not done by our operation.” 
The language is taken straight from the Latin Avicenna, even down 
to the technical term res, where a more Aristotelian entia might be 
expected. Most telling of all, Thomas describes the speculative sci-
ences negatively—“things not done by our operation”—just as Avi-
cenna had done, though Aristotle never had.  
 At this point, Avicenna had proceeded directly to further divisions 
of the theoretical sciences. Before doing that, however, Br. Thomas felt 
the need to justify why motion and matter should be the criteria used to 
distinguish the sciences, something both Aristotle and Avicenna had sim-
ply taken for granted. The reason he does so is because knowledge is a 
relation of knower to known, and so concerns the objects studied in a 
science. Now what is essential to that relation is not the same as what is 
essential to the thing known. Thomas illustrates the point using sensa-
tion. “For to be an animal or plant is accidental to an object of sense, 
taken as object. This is why distinctions among the senses are not based 
on this difference, but rather on the difference between color and sound” 
(2aAq). Now Plato and Aristotle had distinguished different kinds of cog-
nition based solely on real differences in the things cognized. Plato had 
distinguished four different levels of intellectual knowledge based solely 
on the differences among four kinds of things known; and Aristotle had 
distinguished different kinds of knowledge—both sensory and intellec-
tual—based of different real features of things known.37 But Avicenna 
had introduced a subjective component into his division of the sciences, 
as we have seen. One of his criteria for determining the subjects of the 
theoretical sciences was whether the things studied are subject to motion 
37. PLATO, Republic VI (509d4-511e2). Aristotle: see ARISTOTLE, On the Soul, On 
sensation: II.3 (414a28-415a15), II.6 (418a7-26), III. 2-3 (426b7-429a8). On in-
tellectual knowledge, see chart: 1-15Ar. Also, On the Soul, III.4-5 (530126).
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and matter; but his other criterion was whether our knowledge of them 
includes sensible matter and motion. Thomas takes Avicenna’s ‘inner 
turn’ even further. In order to conclude that the objective or extrinsic 
criterion for distinguishing the sciences must be “separation from matter 
and motion” (2cAq), for premises proving this conclusion he turns to the 
subjective side, inside the intellect, in a section (2a, b, cAq) that has no 
parallel in Aristotle, or even Avicenna. 
Now in the object of speculation—which is the object of a 
speculative power—one thing is taken from the side of the 
intellectual power, and another thing is taken from the habit 
of science that perfects the intellect. From the side of the 
intellect is taken the fact that it [the object] is immaterial, 
since the intellect itself is immaterial; while from the side of the 
science is taken the fact that it [the object] is necessary, since 
science concerns necessary things. (2bAq)38
The fi rst reason Aquinas gives here is not objective but subjective: 
the fact that the intellect itself is a power that is immaterial is what 
justifi es using ‘material vs. immaterial’ as a criterion for determin-
ing the subjects of the theoretical sciences. And the second reason 
is equally subjective:  a science is a habit developed in the intellect. 
Now the habit of scientifi c knowledge, as distinct from opinions or 
sensations, is “necessary”; and since “everything that is necessary, 
as necessary, is immobile” (2cAq), because necessity eliminates the 
possibility of change, it follows that ‘mobility vs. immobility’ is a 
second criterion for determining the subjects of the theoretical sci-
ences. Here Br. Thomas was clearly inspired by Avicenna’s inward 
turn, even though this argument is his own. 
 To this point in his “response,” Br. Thomas has distinguished 
the practical from the theoretical sciences, arguing from their ends 
38. AQUINAS, Super Boethii de trinitate, q. 5, art. 2c: Speculabili autem, quod est obiectum 
speculativae potentiae, aliquid competit ex parte intellectivae potentiae et aliquid ex 
parte habitus scientiae quo intellectus perfi citur. Ex parte siquidem intellectus com-
petit ei quod sit immateriale, quia et ipse intellectus immaterialis est; ex parte vero 
scientiae competit ei quod sit necessarium, quia scientia de necessariis est.
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and their subject-matters, he has defended using the criteria of 
‘mobility vs. immobility’ and ‘material vs. immaterial in the di-
vision of the theoretical sciences, and he has done so in an un-
Aristotelian but Avicennian manner. He is now ready to return 
to Avicenna’s Introduction and follow it closely, distinguishing the 
three theoretical sciences in terms of their subjects or “matters.” 
And since he is following Avicenna, he can return to his normal 
practice of clarifying and simplifying Avicenna’s doctrines. 
 Since “the speculative sciences are distinguished based upon 
their level of separation from matter and motion,” he begins with 
the objective side, the realities studied. “Now there are some ob-
jects of speculation that depend upon matter for their existence, 
because they cannot exist except in matter” (5Aq). Again, the lan-
guage of “existence (esse)” shows he is following Avicenna. And he 
immediately proceeds to adopt Avicenna’s next division: 
And these are distinguished, because some depend upon matter 
both for their existence and for being understood, such as those things 
in whose defi nition we posit sensible matter, for example, in the 
defi nition of a human it is necessary to include fl esh and bones. 
Physical or natural science is about these kinds of things (7Aq).
Here Br. Thomas combines succinctly three points Avicenna had made 
more diffusely. First, he continues to use the Avicennian language of 
existence. These “objects of speculation (speculabilium) … depend upon 
matter for their existence (secundum esse),” using esse in the technical 
Avicennian sense he has already made his own. Second and most im-
portant, he uses two criteria to describe the things studied in physics. 
They depend upon matter for their existence, to be sure, but also for 
“being understood (secundum … intellectum).” It is this second, subjec-
tive criterion that is crucial in order sharply to differentiate physics 
from mathematics; and it is borrowed directly from Avicenna, as we 
have seen. Third, the point is driven home with an example, also drawn 
from Avicenna, not from Aristotle: a human, whose defi nition—even 
though universal—must include physical matter of a specifi c sort: “fl esh 
and bones.”  Some of the materials for Br. Thomas’s description are 
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 48/1 (2015) 19-54
THE FRIAR AND THE VIZIER ON THE RANGE OF THE THEORETICAL SCIENCES
43
found in Aristotle—matter and using an appropriate defi nition, like 
“snub” rather than “concave.” But it was Avicenna, not Aristotle, who 
had put these materials together in just the way Thomas has, opening 
the way for his lapidary formulations. 
 Br. Thomas then proceeds immediately to mathematical science: 
But there are some things that, even though they depend 
upon matter in order to exist,  they do not depend upon mat-
ter for being understood, because sensible matter is not posited 
in their defi nitions, such as line and number. And mathemati-
cal science is about these kinds of things (8Aq).
Here the possibilities of Avicenna’s ‘inward turn’ toward cognition 
are fully realized. Like the objects studied in physics, the things math-
ematics studies “depend upon matter to exist (secundum esse).” The 
language of being and the doctrine follow Avicenna. But the more 
important half of Br. Thomas’s description of these objects is the sub-
jective one: they can be understood without the “sensible matter” they 
require for real existence. All Thomas has done is change Avicenna’s 
“proper matter” to “sensible matter,” which makes the point more 
precisely. The defi nitions of the objects studied in mathematics do 
not require, indeed, they cannot include the kind of physical matter 
we can sense. Following Avicenna’s Introduction closely, this is all that 
Thomas says here in Art. 1. But in Art. 3, devoted to a more detailed 
study of the subject of mathematics, he will add that they require a 
different, “intelligible matter,” because the quantities and qualities 
mathematics studies, cannot be completely separated, either in real-
ity or even in thought, from all matter, since these two categories, 
in their very nature, depend upon a subject in which they inhere. 
Finally, Br. Thomas clearly distinguishes the subjects of geometry 
and arithmetic with the examples of “line and number.” In Metaphys-
ics E.1, Aristotle had not distinguished the objects of arithmetic and 
geometry, nor had he given any examples. Avicenna, by contrast, had 
clearly distinguished the two branches of mathematics in his Introduc-
tion, and had offered as examples “square” and “number.” On all these 
points, Br. Thomas follows in the footsteps of Avicenna.  
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 Br. Thomas then turns to metaphysics, again offering a clearly 
Avicennian treatment, because his conception of metaphysics in-
corporates Avicenna’s developments beyond Aristotle.
 
And there are other objects of speculation that do not depend 
on matter for existence, because they can exist without mat-
ter, either they are never in matter, such as God or an angel, or 
in some things they exist in matter and in others not, such as 
substance, quality, being (ens), potency, act, one and many, 
and things like this. (11/12Aq)
We have seen how Avicenna moved well beyond Aristotle in bifur-
cating the contents of metaphysics into rational theology and on-
tology. “Being as being” Avicenna had said must somehow include 
the two things Aristotle’s text had seemed unable to reconcile—the 
study of being in its universality, which must include things that can 
exist in matter, as well as the highest, purely spiritual beings. In his 
Introduction, Avicenna had divided these two parts of metaphysics by 
noting that it includes some things that, in their very natures, must 
be completely immaterial. Br. Thomas does the same thing here, 
and even uses Avicenna’s own examples—God and an angel, the 
Biblical name of an Avicennian “intelligence.” 
 In the other half of this division, Avicenna had included things that 
can exist without matter, but also can exist in matter; and Br. Thomas 
repeats Avicenna’s all-important “can.” His examples of topics taken up 
in ontology include two taken right out of Avicenna’s Introduction: “one 
and many.” But he understood that a reader unfamiliar with Avicenna’s 
Metaphysics might fi nd Avicenna’s “identity” and “cause” diffi cult to un-
derstand, especially if the reader were familiar with the four scholastic 
transcendentals: being, one, true, and good. So he emended Avicenna’s 
list, adding “being, potency, and act,” all of which are transcendentals 
which run through the whole list of the ten categories, or beyond the 
categories. But why did Thomas add “substance” and “quality”? The 
most plausible explanation is that Avicenna’s four examples in his In-
troduction—identity, unity, number, and causality—did not include any 
of Aristotle’s ten categories, that is, anything whose extension was less 
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than the full extension of being. But he well knew that Avicenna had 
treated the categories of substance, quantity, quality, and relation in the 
ontology contained in Bks. 2 and 3 of his Metaphysics, as “quasi species” 
of being. So in order for his own examples to cover the full range of 
Avicenna’s ontology, its “quasi species” as well as its “quasi essential ac-
cidents,” he added these examples. What is important for our purposes 
is that it is inconceivable that Br. Thomas would have come up with 
the exact list of examples he did, unless he was basing his own writing 
in Art. 1 on Avicenna’s Introduction. 
*    *    *
We have seen Br. Thomas follow the language and manner of argu-
ment of Avicenna. In distinguishing physics from mathematics, Br. 
Thomas has taken Avicenna’s introduction of subjective criteria for 
distinguishing them, and improved upon it. His two criteria—whether 
the thing studied must exist in matter or not, and how knowledge of 
it incorporates matter—open up a very precise understanding of the 
“subjects” of the natural and mathematical sciences. Even more im-
portantly, Br. Thomas also followed Avicenna when it comes to meta-
physics, dividing the things studied in metaphysics into two kinds. 
The fi rst are those that can exist in separation from matter: being, its 
quasi-species (the ten categories) and its quasi properties (the tran-
scendentals). The second are things that must exist in separation from 
matter: the ontological causes of physical things, God and the angels. 
By following Avicenna, Br. Thomas could accept Aristotle’s concep-
tion of the “subject” of physics, improve on Aristotle’s description of 
the “subject” of mathematics, and transform Aristotle’s conception of 
what metaphysics studies. And most important of all, following the 
Vizier in holding that “being” is the “subject” of metaphysics, while 
God is its cause and end, opened the way for a new “divine science,” 
the “theology that is taught in sacred scripture.”39 For a full picture 
39. AQUINAS, Super Boethii de trinitate, q. 5, art. 4c. Let me here add my thanks to my 
colleagues in the international “Aquinas and the ‘Arabs’” project. www.Aquina-
sAndTheArabs.org
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of Thomas’s accomplishment, however, we must turn to Art. 2-4; but 
that is a task for another day.
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APPENDIX
Note: All three texts follow the order of presentation in their re-
spective authors.  The text numbers, however, follow the order of 
Avicenna, in order to show parallels. 
TRANSLATION FROM GREEK
Aristotle, Met. VI, 1 
(Greek: ed. Ross, Oxford, 
1958)
TRANSLATION FROM LATIN 
with latin and arabic terms 
in parenthese s
Avicenna, Logica, 
“Introduction to Logic”
(Latin: ed. Venice, 1488; 
Arabic: ed. Cairo, 1952, Logic, 
Eisagoge, c. 2; p. 12-16)
TRANSLATION FROM LATIN
Aquinas, Super Boetii de 
trintate, 5.1c
(3d. Leonina, vol. 50, ed. 1995)
[A. Theoretical 
vs. practical science] 
1Ar) Now we are seeking 
the principles and causes 
of beings, and clearly as 
beings. For there is a cause 
of health and fi tness, and 
there are principles and 
elements and causes of 
mathematicals, and in 
general every deductive 
science or one that shares 
in deduction is about 
causes and principles, more 
or less precise. But all these 
mark off some being or 
genus, dealing with it, but 
they are not about being 
absolutely or as being, nor 
do they give an account of 
the quiddity.  …
[A. Theoretical 
vs. practical science] 
1Av) We say: the purpose 
of philosophy is to 
comprehend the truth of 
all things, in so far as it is 
possible for a human to 
understand. 
[A. Theoretical  
vs. practical science]
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3Ar) Now since natural 
science turns out to be 
about some genus of 
being, for it is about the 
kind of substance in which 
there is a principle of 
motion and rest in itself, 
it is clear that it is not 
practical or productive. 
For of things made the 
principle is in the maker, 
either understanding 
or art or some power, 
while of things done it 
is in the doer, choice; 
for what is done and 
what is chosen are the 
same. Therefore, if all 
intellectual knowledge is 
practical or productive or 
theoretical, natural science 
is a theoretical science; 
but it is a theoretical 
science about the kind 
of being which is able to 
be moved, and about the 
kind of substance that in 
defi nition is for the most 
part only inseparable.
2Av) Now the things 
that are either have 
existence not owing 
to our choice or 
operation, or they have 
existence owing to our 
choice or operation.  
Knowledge of the 
fi rst type is called 
speculative philosophy, 
while knowledge of the 
second type is called 
active philosophy.  
3Av) The end of 
speculative philosophy 
is nothing other than 
the perfection of the 
soul as simply knowing; 
while the end of 
practical philosophy is 
not as simply knowing 
but as knowing 
what one ought to 
do and doing it. 
Therefore, the end of 
speculative philosophy 
is apprehending a 
proposition (sententiae) 
that does not lead 
to operation, while 
the end of practical 
science is knowing 
a proposition that 
does lead to an 
operation. Therefore, 
the speculative is the 
more valuable kind of 
science.
3Aq) The theoretical 
or speculative intellect is 
properly distinguished from 
the operative or practical 
intellect from the fact that 
the speculative intellect 
has for its end the truth 
it considers, while the 
practical intellect orders 
the truth it considers to 
operation as to its end. 
Therefore, the Philosopher 
says in On the Soul 3 that 
they differ from each 
other in their ends, and 
in Metaphysics 2 that “the 
end of speculative science 
is truth, but the end of 
operative science is action.”
2Aq) Therefore, 
since matter must be 
proportionate to the 
end, it is necessary that 
the [subject] matter of the 
practical sciences is those 
things that can be done 
by our operation, so that 
knowledge of them can be 
ordered to operation as to 
an end. But it is necessary 
that the [subject] matter 
of the speculative sciences 
is those things that are not 
done by our operation, 
so that consideration of 
them cannot be ordered to 
operation as to an end. 
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[A.1: Why the sciences are 
distinguished using mobility 
and matter] 
2aAq) Now we should 
know that when habits or 
powers are distinguished 
by their objects, they are 
not distinguished by just 
any differences among 
their objects, but by those 
that are essential to the 
objects as objects. For to 
be an animal or plant is 
accidental to an object of 
sense, taken as object. This 
is why distinctions among 
the senses are not based 
on this difference, but 
rather on the difference 
between color and sound. 
Therefore, the speculative 
sciences must be divided 
based on differences among 
the objects of speculation, 
taken as objects of 
speculation. 
2bAq) Now in the object 
of speculation—which is 
the object of a speculative 
power—one thing is 
taken from the side of  the 
intellectual power, and 
another thing is taken from 
the habit of science that 
perfects the intellect. From 
the side of the intellect 
is taken the fact that it 
[the object] is immaterial, 
since the intellect itself is 
immaterial; while from the 
side of the science is taken 
the fact that it [the object] 
is necessary, since science 
concerns necessary things, 
as is shown in Posterior 
Analytics 1 [6, 74b5-75a37]. 
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4Ar)  Now how the essence 
and the defi nition are 
must not escape us, since 
without this our search 
accomplishes nothing. 
Now of the things defi ned 
and of quiddities some 
are like snub and others 
are like concave. For 
these differ in that snub is 
connected with matter, for 
the snub thing is a concave 
nose, while concavity is 
lacking sensible matter.  
4Av) The things of the 
fi rst type whose existence 
does not come from our 
will or operation are 
divided into two, into 
things mixed with motion 
and things not mixed 
with motion.
5Av) Now things mixed 
with motion are divided 
into two: into things that 
do not have existence 
unless it is possible 
that they be mixed 
with motion, such are 
humanity and square and 
similar things; or into 
things that have existence 
without this [possibility 
of motion]. 
2cAq) Now everything 
that is necessary, as 
necessary, is immobile, 
because for everything 
that is moved, as moved, 
it is possible that it exist or 
not exist, either absolutely 
or in some respect, as 
is said in Metaphysics IX 
[8, 1050b11-15]. This 
is why to the object of 
speculation, so far as it is 
the object of speculative 
science, essentially involves 
separation from matter and 
motion or application to them. 
Therefore, the speculative 
sciences are distinguished 
based upon their level of 
separation from matter and 
motion.  
5Aq) Now there are some 
objects of speculation 
that depend upon matter 
for their existence, because 
they cannot exist except 
in matter. And these are 
distinguished,
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[B) Natural Science] 
7Ar) So if all natural things 
are said in a way like snub, 
for example, nose, eye, face, 
fl esh, bone, and in general 
animal, leaf, root, bark, and 
in general plant—for the 
defi nition of none of these 
is without motion—it is 
clear how one must seek 
and defi ne the quiddity for 
natural things, and why to 
look even at soul in a way 
belongs to the naturalist, 
so much of it that is not 
without matter. From these 
points, then, it is clear 
that natural science is a 
theoretical science. 
[C. Mathematics]
8Ar) But mathematical 
science is also a theoretical 
science. But whether it 
is about immobile and 
separate things is not 
now clear. But it is clear 
that it studies some 
mathematicals as immobile 
and as separate. 
[B) Natural Science] 
7Av) for they are such 
that they can neither exist 
nor be understood without 
their proper matter, for 
example, the form of a 
human or an ass; 
[C. Mathematics]
8Av) or such that 
they can be understood 
but they cannot exist 
without matter, for 
example, square, since to 
understand this it is not 
absolutely necessary to 
connect it to some species 
of [substantial] form, nor 
must one consider it in 
relation to some aspect of 
motion.
[B) Natural Science]
7Aq)  because some 
depend upon matter 
both for their existence 
and for being understood, 
such as those things in 
whose defi nition we 
posit sensible matter, for 
example, in the defi nition 
of a human it is necessary 
to include fl esh and 
bones. Physical or natural 
science is about these 
kinds of things. 
[C. Mathematics]
8Aq) But there are some 
things that, even though 
they depend upon matter 
in order to exist, they do 
not depend upon matter 
for being understood, 
because sensible matter 
is not posited in their 
defi nitions, such as 
line and number. And 
mathematical science 
is about these kinds of 
things. 
6Av) Now things that do 
not have existence unless 
it is possible that they be 
mixed with motion are 
again divided into two: 
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[D. Metaphysics] 
[D1. Rational theology] 
10Ar) Now if there is 
something eternal and 
immobile and separate, it 
is clear that knowing this 
belongs to theoretical 
science; but not to natural 
science, for natural science 
is about things moved, 
nor to mathematical 
science, but to a science 
prior to both. For natural 
science is about things 
that are [not] separate and 
are not immobile, and 
mathematical science is 
about some things that 
are immobile but also not 
separate, but that are in 
matter. But the fi rst science 
is about things that are 
separate and immobile. Now 
it is necessary that all the 
causes be eternal, and 
especially these, for these 
are the causes for what 
appears of the divine. 
[D. Metaphysics] 
9Av) Things that can 
be mixed with motion, 
but also have existence 
without it, are things like 
identity, unity, multiplicity, 
and causality.
[D1. Rational theology] 
10Av) Among the things 
that can be denuded 
(denudari ; tajarrad) of 
motion is truth, which 
takes two forms: either 
necessary truth, such as 
God and an intelligence, 
 
[D. Metaphysics]
[D1. Rational theology] 
10Aq) And there 
are other objects of 
speculation that do not 
depend on matter for 
existence, because they 
can exist without matter, 
either they are never in 
matter, such as God or an 
angel, 
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[D2. Ontology] 
11Av) or truth that is not 
necessary but is truth 
for things that are not 
impossible, for example, the 
disposition of identity, unity, 
causality, and the kind of 
number that is multiplicity.
12Av) Now these things 
are considered in so far as 
they are what they are and 
consideration of them does 
not change when they are 
despoiled (spoliatae sunt ; 
mujarradat) [from matter].  
But they will then be part 
of the consideration about 
things in so far as they are 
not in matter, because these 
things as such are not in 
matter.  
13Av) Alternately, these 
things are considered 
in so far as it accrues to 
them to have existence 
only in matter. Now this 
consideration is again 
divided into two: one of 
which is that they can be 
understood only in relation 
to specifi c matter and motion.  
For example, consideration 
of the one in so far as it is air 
or fi re; consideration of the 
many in so far as they are 
the elements; consideration 
of cause in so far as it is cold 
or heat; and consideration 
of a second, intelligible 
[act], in so far as it belongs 
to animals, namely, a 
principle of bodily motion, 
even if, when separated 
[mufāraqa; separata] from 
it, it can exist on its own. 
[D2. Ontology] 
11Aq) or in some things 
they exist in matter and 
in others not, such as 
substance, quality, being 
(ens), potency, act, one and 
many, and things like this. 
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14Av) Now even though 
this only occurs in 
relation to matter and 
with admixture of motion, 
nevertheless, sometimes 
their dispositions can be 
understood and verifi ed 
without consideration of 
their proper matter and 
motion.  This kind of 
consideration happens, 
for example, concerning 
addition and subtraction 
(al-tafrīq; segregatione), 
multiplication and 
division, and the fi nding 
of a root, and in the other 
dispositions that follow on 
number.  For these follow 
on number and exist in 
the intellect of humans or 
in existing moving things 
that are divided, subtracted 
(mutafarriqat, segretatis) or 
added. But understanding 
these things sometimes 
can be abstracted (abstrahi ; 
tajarrada)  in a certain way, 
so that it is not necessary 
to assign specifi c matter 
to them.  
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[E. Three theoretical 
philosophies] 
15Av) Therefore, the 
parts of the sciences are 
speculative knowledge 
about understanding those 
things that have existence 
and reality in motion and 
depend on the matter of 
their proper species, 
or speculative knowledge 
about what is separate 
(mufāraqāt, separata) from 
the matter of their proper 
species only in thought , 
or about things separate 
(mufāraqāt, separata ) 
from these conditions 
both in existence and in 
understanding.  
Now the fi rst division is 
natural science.  The second 
is pure mathematics and the 
science of number, namely, 
what is better known, for 
knowledge of the matter 
of number as number does 
not pertain to mathematics.  
And the third part is divine 
science, which comes after 
those natural things taken 
up in the manner of physical 
science.  Now these are the 
speculative sciences.
[E. Three names 
of metaphysics]
15Aq) And about all 
these sorts of things is 
theology, that is, divine 
science, so named because 
in it the premier object 
of cognition is God. 
By another name it is 
called metaphysics, that is, 
beyond physics, because 
we learn it after physics, 
since we proceed from 
sensible things to the 
things that cannot be 
sensed. And it is also 
called fi rst philosophy, to 
the extent that all the 
other sciences, taking 
their principles from it, 
follow it.
16Aq) Now it is not 
possible that there are 
other things, that depend 
upon matter for being 
understood but not for 
their existence, since the 
intellect, taken in itself, 
is immaterial. Therefore, 
there is no fourth genus 
of philosophy, beyond the 
ones indicated.
